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Abstract: With the purge of the Military Forces and the creation of a new National Civilian Police (PNC) as
mandated by the 1992 Peace Accords, El Salvador set the stage for the construction of a less state-oriented
security approach. However, a failure to question issues of security and a lack of consideration of gender in
the Peace negotiations and the Security Reform resulted in an overly gendered understanding of security,
were the State remained as its subject and the practice privileged a militarized masculinity that has hindered
the implementation of democratic policing. In this context, 25 years after the Peace Accords, the police have
been unable to consolidate a democratic policing practice as oppressive policing strategies remain deeply
embedded in the institution, side-by-side with heavy-handed measures that use repression to control social
violence. From a feminist critical security approach, the article questions the gendered nature of security in
El Salvador, and investigates the implication of the introduction of militaries into the work of the police, in
terms of its symbolic influence in the gendered expectations of police men and women, and the practical
impact it has on their work, e.g., the difficulty of consolidating Community-Oriented Policing. The argument
is based on interviews and focus groups with police men and women, as well as with feminist organizations.
The information was gathered during fieldwork in 2018 and 2019, and through extensive literature review.
Keywords: community-oriented policing; El Salvador; gender; human security; militarized-masculinity;
police reform; security reform
1. Introduction
The greatest success of the Security Reform after the Peace
Accords in El Salvador in 1992, together with the demobi-
lization of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
guerrilla (FMLN, by its Spanish acronym), was the disman-
tling of the country’s old security forces. Following this, the
major triumph was the creation of a new civilian and pro-
fessional police, the National Civil Police (or PNC, by its
Spanish acronym).
At the start of 2017, the Salvadoran PNC celebrated
the 25th anniversary of its establishment. Implicitly, this
commemoration was also a celebration of democracy and
the allegedly successful Security Reform. However, by the
end of the same year, the police found itself facing a crisis
of legitimacy caused by several cases of suicide, domes-
tic violence, and feminicide, occurring at the heart of the
institution. The country was shocked to learn from media
coverage of the shooting and disappearance of the police of-
ficer Carla Ayala by another police, a member of the Police
Reaction Group (or GRP, by its Spanish acronym), following
a Christmas celebration party [1].This event prompted the
dismantling of the GRP, but the crisis did not end there. To
this case a long list of accusations of impunity, abuse of
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power, and extrajudicial killings was added [2].
These events were embarrassing for a police institu-
tion keen to celebrate a quarter of a century of existence
operating under a democratic and civilian security model.
Accusations of the police are not new. Indeed, it is con-
nected to slowly increasing levels of distrust between civil
society and the police, particularly to the police’s abuse of
force, its partisan role, and lack of accountability [3]. It also
reflects the apparent inability of the police to guarantee pub-
lic security under a democratic mandate in a highly violent
scenario [4], and moreover, their inability to protect their
members from gender-based violence within the institution.
The police are not alone in defining how security and
gender relations are understood and performed in El Sal-
vador. As a national institution, the Salvadorian police force
reflects many of the assumptions of the state, the socio-
cultural constructions of expected gender behaviors, and
the myths that surround them. The police in El Salvador
do not operate in a vacuum as they reflect the political
contradictions of a post-conflict country with high levels of
social and criminal violence. The contradictions involved
with implementing both soft and hard security policies and
practices have further added to the crisis of legitimacy of
the PNC.
Considering the wider background of this case, I aim to
demonstrate in this article that the crisis reflects a longer
history of challenges within the Salvadoran police, and that
two major persisting difficulties rest in the understanding of
gender and security. I argue that the crisis demonstrates
the lack of a gendered approach to the Peace Accords and
the Security Reform process. It also suggests that a limited
understanding of security and blindness to gender, both on
the political and technical level, has enabled the gradual
militarization of the police despite the formal attempts of
the security reform to avoid this outcome. Both difficulties
have intertwined to actively hinder the planned police re-
form, specifically the implementation of democratic policing
strategies focused on crime prevention with a communitar-
ian approach (i.e. Community-Oriented Policing). While the
focus of this article is unpacking the connections of gender
and security in El Salvador, Community-Oriented Policing
(COP) serves as an empirical example to discuss ‘How the
gendered expectations of security in El Salvador hindered
the security reform and the ongoing implementation of a
democratic police?’.
This article argues that the security policy is gendered
and rests on expectations that privilege a masculine and
militaristic approach. As a result, the police favor short-term,
operative police tactics as a response to violence and crim-
inalization in the country. This occurs despite the police’s
simultaneous public advertisement of its use of integral so-
cial approaches to security and a new community-oriented
approach to policing. This eloquent contradiction speaks of
the gendered expectations of the security approach in El
Salvador—which naturalize a masculine nature—, and the
limits and disparities evident in the definition of the subject
of security. As it stands, the subject of security is state-
centric, thus, the focus of security is still engaged in the
logics of the defense of the territory—a means to legitimize
the use of force by the state.
This article responds to its central question by analyzing
the empirical findings of a six-month data collection process
in El Salvador—split into two periods in 2018 and 2019—in
contrast with secondary data detailing Salvadoran security
policies. The research was mainly carried out in San Sal-
vador and its metropolitan area, with some visits to rural
areas in Santa Ana and Cabañas departments. The data
referred to includes three semi-structured interviews with
senior police officers; four group-interviews with female and
male police agents; and three semi-structure interviews
with feminist women organizations. Unless personal names
were already part of public information, all the names used
in this research have been changed to protect the identities
of the participants.
The argument proceeds as follows, in the first section I
briefly discuss why is relevant to discuss gender and secu-
rity from a feminist approach, situating the case of El Sal-
vador and drawing on a feminist-inspired discussion of the
gendered and violent nature of Salvadorian security policy.
In the second section, I argue that the state has adopted a
masculine identity that directly affects the security policy in
terms that privilege a male experience of security—allowing
for the militarization of security. To illustrate this position, I
briefly introduce the history of the Salvadoran police and
the clash of interests that exists between traditional polic-
ing and COP. The third section illustrates how privileging
masculine expectations to the police has implications for
the involvement of women in the work of the police. It also
addresses the discussion of how gender approaches can
support a process of transformation of militarized policing
into democratic police, with the inclusion of women’s and
LGBTI people’s security concerns for the implementation of
Community-Oriented Policing.
2. A Short Note on the Limits to Existing Gender and
Security Research in El Salvador
Situating this article within the context of academic
and policy-driven discussions regarding the post-conflict
(in)security in El Salvador, it has become evident that there
is a considerable literature on the topic of policing in the
country. However, it is also evident that there is a significant
gap in this literature with regards to the issue of gender
and human security. Most of the existing literature on the
Salvadorian police addresses the political, social and se-
curity issues of the post-agreement period. The majority
of literature also focuses on the Peace Accords and the
immediate institutional adoption of democracy after the war.
Mainly employing a traditional state-centric analysis, the
discussion has focused on the implementation of the Ac-
cords, the lessons learned [5–7]; and the difficulties that
accompanied the security sector reform with a focus on the
creation of the new police [8–10].
Studies emerging in the 1990s attempted to explain the
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recurrent high levels of criminality and the challenges to the
post-conflict governments [11,12]. Additionally, scholarly
work done in the late 1990s and early 2000s focused on
post conflict security and channeled the discussion towards
the questionable construction of the youth gangs as the
problem of security. Influential studies discussed the gangs
and their impact on security [13–18]. Other researchers
focused on the responses by different governments and the
politicization of security that followed the construction of
a security narrative in El Salvador [19–22]. Some studies
also focused on the role of the elites and the economic and
political processes in the construction of a weak democracy
and a failed state of security for the majority of the people
[23–25]. However, none of these studies directly referred to
the police and policing.
A second wave of research was more closely aligned
with feminist concerns given its focus on the role of women
in the post-conflict period, and specifically in the peace
building process. It was concerned with the change of roles
from being combatants or supporters of the revolution, to
political actors and peace and development activists [26–
28]. The late post-conflict period in the early 2000s also saw
the resurfacing of scholarship focused on women and secu-
rity. This scholarship studied and discussed gender-based
violence in the form of feminicides and criminalization of
abortion in a patriarchal and machista society[29–32].
While there is a great deal of literature dealing with se-
curity and gender in El Salvador, very little research has
paid attention to the intersection between gender and se-
curity. Even less research has specifically discussed the
structural operation of the police and the gendered nature
of security policy. This article addresses some of the gaps
in the literature by discussing the gendered nature of the
security policy in El Salvador from a feminist perspective,
specifically by observing how the gendered nature of the
security policy influences the implementation of new ap-
proaches to policing. The article aim is to contribute to a
new and growing literature focusing on different approaches
to policing that can reduce violence through prevention and
community relations, such as Community-Oriented Policing
[33].
3. Why a Feminist discussion on Gender and
Security?
It is important to acknowledge how the Security Reform
negotiated in the Peace Agreement in 1992 echoed the
security discussion that was taking place in international
contexts during 1990s, in an emergent post-cold war en-
vironment. The discussion raised a critique of the narrow
military orientation of the realist security paradigm, suggest-
ing a shift in security to include ordinary people’s concerns.
Proposals were made to ‘focus on the individual as the
subject of security’ [34]; and to question the primacy of the
state as the referent of security. Challenging the ‘national
security’ approach, ‘Human Security’ emerged as a new
paradigm. At its core, human security is concentrated on
the individual and a wider spectrum of security threats that
could happen within and outside the state. These threats
include concerns regarding development and human rights,
as a replacement to the traditional focus on state-centered
security based on military and territorial defense [34].
Furthermore, Feminist Critical Security scholars have
been challenging the traditional equation of security with the
military defense of the state [35,36] by inquiring about the
individuals and the contexts for whom and where security is
defined. In doing so, they connect militarized state security
to women’s insecurities to expose the masculinity embed-
ded in traditional security thinking [35]. Feminist theories,
therefore, render explicit “how gender is deeply implicated in
the way in which particular bodies experience and execute
threat and violence”[35]. In this sense, feminism invites a
radical re-thinking of security to bring the category closer
to individuals and the way everyday life is impacted by and
has an impact on security thinking [36]. Critical feminist
approaches to security are then closer to a more human
approach to security, in comparison to traditional realist
approaches to security. A human security approach, con-
sidering its critiques, takes seriously the notion that people
can be insecure within a secure state because the nature
of their threats are different than those of the state; mean-
ing that the state has the potential of becoming a threat to
people [34].
The subject within the human security approach has
commonly been the person, which is integral to ‘citizen.’
However, the person is never neutral, and its meaning is
embedded in the socio-cultural construction of sex, gender,
class, race and political affiliation [37]. Hence, a feminist
perspective also helps to challenge the definition of the
subject of security. Furthermore, a critical understanding
of security challenges the alleged objectivity or subjectiv-
ity of security to connect it to a socio-cultural construction
that creates a social order [38]. Therefore, if a security
approach does not address these issues, it overlooks its
gendered and socially biased construction and omits its
impact on people’s everyday experiences. Human security
in the context of this article is understood in dialogue with
feminist studies as an approach that rests on the person
instead of the state, but recognizes the plurality of identities
that conform the subject; remaining vigilant of the various
possibilities where diverse ways of living can be threatened
by the state [34].
In El Salvador, feminists also challenge a traditional no-
tion of security, by recognizing the different security needs
of women, men, and of the LGBTQ population in the coun-
try within the diversity of their social mobilizations. They
question how these needs intersect with other social char-
acteristics such as class, race, age, disabilities, and occu-
pation to understand different positions of power. Instead
of further developing this intersectional understanding of
the differentiated security needs, however, I argue in this
article that security in El Salvador is militarized because
it only defends the interests of the state. Therefore, by
adopting and adapting a feminist approach, I can establish
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a theoretical foundation that helps to explore the impact of
gender expectations and masculinity, in relations of power
within the police and between the police and heterogeneous
communities. Hence, this approach provides a way to un-
derstand violent community-police relationships and the
increase in cases of gender-based violence (GBV) against
women within the police.
4. Gendered Security in El Salvador: between a Soft
and a Hard Position
After 12 years of intense armed conflict and the prioritiza-
tion of counter-insurgency strategies as the state’s security
policy [39], in 1992 the Peace Accords and the Security Re-
form promised a fresh civilian beginning for a post-conflict
nation. The security reform mandated the creation of the
new National Civil Police (PNC), which were to receive
mandatory training at a new National Academy of Public
Security [40]
With the aim of creating a new civilian-police body, the
Peace Accords established quotas for the number of ex-
combatants, from both the dismantled public security forces
and the demobilized guerilla forces members (ibid.). A ra-
tio of 60/40 was set giving favor to a civilian majority, and
the equal distribution of the remaining ratio between ex-
combatants. The new police body was trained under a
novel civilian security doctrine focused on human rights and
democratic values, and in opposition to a military instruction.
For this reason, the National Academy of Public Security
(or ANSP, by its Spanish acronym) was created as an au-
tonomous and civilian academic body with the responsibility
of training and professionalizing the police focusing on the
service to the community. Besides professionalization, the
quota system supported the idea of national reconciliation
between former enemies. This idea, however, was threaten-
ing to turn the PNC into a new scenario of political dispute
[41]. The politicization of the police can also be explained
with the resistance of the military and the conservative po-
litical elites to its creation. This resistance, and subsequent
acceptance of military personnel into the police, would re-
tard the consolidation of its civilian and democratic mandate
[4,7].
Security reform in El Salvador pledged to not only be
humanitarian in focus, but gender neutral in approach. Dis-
tancing itself from a gender sensitive perspective, the se-
curity concerns discussed in the reform only responded
to the promise of human security, in the sense that they
re-focused the object of security to the individual. However,
that individual, as feminist security scholars had previously
critiqued, has been understood as neutral only to leave the
question about ‘the subject matter and politics of security’
out of the negotiations [42]. In other words, gender was not
recognized as intrinsic to understanding the configuration
of the subject of security, therefore, neither the meaning of
security nor the recipient of that security and the context
where security would take place, were questioned [35].
Consequently, there was neither a discussion on the
different gender roles performed by men and women during
the war, nor on the social norms and expectations, includ-
ing the differential needs and difficulties that they would
encounter in the post conflict. From a critical feminist ap-
proach, gender neutrality could be reframed as a ‘gender
blindness’ created by a male perspective, which reinforces
gender inequalities in society. Therefore, without contem-
plating the security concerns raised by feminist scholars
and organizations alike, it is possible to say that it lacked
gender awareness in the definition of security and the role
of the state as guarantor and architect of security [43].
Furthermore, the discussion introduced by Critical Se-
curity Feminists that questioned gendered myths and as-
sumptions associated with militarized security, connecting
them to the marginalization of women from security and
privileging men in a dominant position [44], was ignored.
Hence, women were not included in the peace negotia-
tions despite their having taken an active role in the civil
war, organized around the need for peace, and pushed for
dialogue [27,28]. Only three high-ranking female FMLN
commanders took part in the negotiations, and although
they raised gender concerns, their participation was not as
women but as ex-combatants [28]. Hence, there is very
little evidence of the impact they had inside the negotiations
in terms of bringing gender awareness into the Peace Ac-
cords [28,45]. As it was reported by ‘Las Dignas’, a leading
Salvadoran women’s organization, “there is not any refer-
ence to women either in the words nor in the spirit of the
accords” [46]. Therefore, in accordance to the critics from
Security Feminist scholars, the reform did not challenge
the dominant focus of security within the state whereby it
has historically represented men’s interest and women’s
subjugation [43].
For the newly created police, however, the Accords gave
a special consideration to female recruitment, but no spe-
cific quotas were established to guarantee it [47]. The fact
that there was no specific gender quota highlights not only
the gender blindness in the process but also the lack of
understanding of gender expectations in the Salvadorian
society. The lack of gender awareness in the discussion
failed to open an equal space for women in a public security
institution, and no consideration was given to the specific-
needs women had in order to access a space dominated by
men. Thus, the fact that women participated did not change
the gendered constitution of the institution or benefited other
women in terms of the security policies, something reflected
in the low numbers of women in the PNC. The first promo-
tion only had 3 women in the highest level; 8 women in
the executive level, and 11 women in the basic level, in
comparison to 30, 65 and 260 men, respectively [48].
It is widely understood that giving attention to gender is
not limited to the recognition of women [44]. Giving atten-
tion to gender in the Salvadorian context is acknowledging
that the failure to reflect on the different gender experiences
during the war neglected the recognition of gendered power
imbalances, and failed to interrogate about who is or should
be the subject of security [49].The resulting ‘gender blind-
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ness’ in the Peace Agreements became another form to
naturalize a male perspective [28], which justified a state-
centric discourse and a traditional masculine-driven security
approach [35,36] to deal with the new post-conflict context.
Bringing a Feminist critique to a Salvadorian gender aware-
ness should then “delegitimize discriminatory practices and
institutions as socio-historical constructions and ‘repoliticize’
orthodox views on security by challenging the role of the
state as provider of security” [42].
Feminist critiques of discriminatory practices based on
gender, such as the division of the public-private space, and
the visibility of the state as a male-constructed institution,
is a way to bring attention to the politics at play in the con-
struction of security in El Salvador. The gendered nature
of the security policy is a representation of the politicization
of security in its masculine approach, which is performed
through increased militarization, limiting its definition.
Because the definition of security is gendered, so are
the institutions for security provision; this is to say that the
practice of security is gendered. As it stands, security in
El Salvador is not neutral and mostly focuses on public
spaces. Thus, despite the introduction of gender and COP
philosophy into the work of the police, the implementation of
security by the police in El Salvador is dependent on politi-
cal agendas that seem to prioritize a masculine perspective
on security by privileging the use of militaries over the intro-
duction of more civilian and communitarian approaches to
security.
5. War against Gangs
Security has been at the center of public attention since
the end of the war. Amplified by media outlets, the high
homicide levels and the social unrest have come to justify
the introduction of immediate responses to security. This
includes highly repressive measures such as massive de-
tentions or the intensification of military and police presence
in the territory [50], in detriment of more integral approaches
to reduce violence. Nevertheless, from a critical perspec-
tive, the increase in security measures during the last 25
years has not been successful in reducing the homicide
level in the country or in addressing the security needs of
all the population.
The popularity of repressive security strategies has its
origin in the securitization of the social problems that af-
fected the country after the war. The increased militarization
is rooted in the influence the armed forces have in the defi-
nition of the security agenda, even after the security reform
took place. The Salvadorian political elite purposely created
the discursive conditions justifying war-like responses i.e.
the creation of a new enemy, and the re-introduction of a
war-like paradigm of security to combat the enemy. In this
context, it proved to be easy to justify immediate responses,
even those using violent means, to a society that was long
used to violence and tired of insecurity [21]. The military
was once more brought into the public security sphere.
The dichotomous military and civilian expectations
within the PNC in El Salvador, are explained in terms of
the military/ guerrilla and civilian quota structure and the
bricolage style of the initial police training. According to
high-ranking police officers interviewed in the Metropolitan
area of San Salvador, the quota system that fractured the
police into political alliances and allowed the military to re-
tain their influence in the new police became a weakness of
the PNC, and what could be named as its ‘original sin,’ [4].
In addition to the military influence within the police, the fact
that the PNC was initially trained based on different police
models hampered it from building its own police model and
fully integrating the mandate of the Peace Accords in its
practice. Therefore, the struggle between a military and a
civilian approach in the police is also explained in terms of
the training the PNC received in its forming stages under
the ONUSAL mandate, as various countries with different
policing models influenced the constitution of the new po-
lice. The two most influential training models came from
Spain, the United States (Puerto Rico), and Chile, which
from 1992–1994 oversaw the ‘Police Intervention’ training
program. Each of them brought their own approaches to
policing [51]. In an interview with a high-ranking police offi-
cer in San Salvador, he mentioned that the National Police
Body of Spain focused their training towards a democratic
and civilian practice, while the Carabineers of Chile and the
Puerto Rican Police, which had a military police structure,
focused more on discipline and order.
It does not come as a surprise that this diversity of ap-
proaches to policing enriched the new police’s identity, as
much as it negatively affected the implementation of a lo-
cally owned approach to the specific Salvadorian context.
This became a limitation when the police landed in the mid-
dle of political interests that reflected these two different
police training models, allowing for the increasing involve-
ment of the military in public security. This has been a major
difficulty for the PNC, as it will be explained below.
From a feminist perspective, to paraphrase Laura
Sjøberg, militarism is the introduction of a war-related mind-
set and activities outside of war-contexts into social and
political life [52]. The introduction of war-contexts is what
justified the militarization of the security in El Salvador. Ac-
cording to Jeannette Aguilar [4], the role of the military in
the internal security has three main periods.
The first period is 1992-2002 i.e. the years after the
Peace Accords. During this time, the governing party took
advantage of the social instability of the postwar to reformu-
late the security discourse in the country. Because of a lack
of personnel in the new PNC, members of the military were
introduced into the patrolling work of the police but under
the guidelines of the PNC [4].
The second period is 2003–2006 and the implemen-
tation of Mano Dura (Iron Fist) and, subsequently, Super
Mano Dura security policies. This period initiated the ‘War
on Gangs’, and successfully reversed the focus of security
from the citizens to the state, identifying youth gangs as
an issue of supreme priority for the security of the coun-
try [17,20,53,54]. As Josefina Echavarría explains [49],
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the consequence of a state-centered security is that when
the object of security is self-reflected and remains unques-
tioned, its capacity to map social insecurities is limited.
Therefore, everything becomes a security concern [49]. In
El Salvador, the recycling of war paradigms of security and
the notion of a ‘public enemy’ were reintroduced as ways to
justify military intervention in public security. Furthermore,
according to Aguilar [4] the impact of these years of intense
militarization of the police was a process of denaturalization
and internal decomposition. The use of violence permeated
the inner fibers of the police. Indeed, even after the Super
Mano Dura plan was officially over, the abusive practices
and excessive use of force and violence remained in the
police subculture [4]. The police continued to target young
poor and marginalized men, resulting in a backlash that led
to the strengthening of the gangs and their mutation into
more organized forms of delinquency [4].
From a feminist critical perspective, this securitization
could be labelled as a ‘masculinist-security paradox’, be-
cause it aims to repress violent masculinities by legitimizing
state-supported masculine display of violence through the
militarization of public security. The success of securitiza-
tion in El Salvador has resulted in the introduction of mili-
tarism as a justifiable approach to public matters of security
that are civilian by definition, which blurs the distinctions
between war and peace, military and civilian [52]. While
suggesting that insecurity has its roots in the use of vio-
lence by other groups different to the state, securitization
has created a war-like scenario that renders invisible the
socio-economic problems of the population and the political
intentions of those in power. This blurry distinction between
military and civilian is problematic on many levels. For the
purpose of the implementation of community-oriented polic-
ing, a war-like logic becomes especially problematic when
defining the role of the community in the process, as the
community could be labelled either as a possible ‘enemy’
or as a potential ‘informant’. This approach does not break
damaging stereotypes, nor does it allow the police to strive
to understand the social positionality of each community.
Moreover, it limits the understanding of COP and its poten-
tial for social transformation.
The change of government in 2009 brought a change
of political discourse and initiated a new third period of
development from 2009 until 2014 [4]. It encouraged the
PNC to go through changes that challenged earlier militarist
and macho practices. In this period, the COP model was
formally adopted and a Gender Unit was established, yet
these changes did not translate into a change to security
practices. Aguilar terms this period as one of ‘militarization
by decree’ [4].
During this period, the executive sanctioned seven de-
crees, and the legislative sanctioned one, extending the
participation of the military in different roles concerning pub-
lic security. Consequently, militarization became the de
facto security policy implemented by the FMLN adminis-
tration, irrespective of the proposed strategic and inclusive
approach to decriminalization [55]. During this time the
military increased their role in public security, removing the
barriers put in place by the Peace Accords to limit the direc-
tion of policing to civilian authorities. For instance, Brigadier
General Francisco Salinas was appointed as the Director
of the Police in 2012, replacing Commissioner Carlos As-
cencio who had a COP approach. This was done based on
the argument that delinquency was at a level beyond the
capacities of the civilian police [4]. Nevertheless, COP was
officially implemented by the time Brigadier General Sali-
nas was appointed, thus his position as the PNC’s general
director did not stop the introduction of COP but did hinder
its implementation.
It can be said that as security reform directly places
powerful interests into question, it is as much a political pro-
cess as it is a police-technical one [41]. It is for this reason
that it took the PNC almost 20 years to formally embrace
its communitarian mandate, and to recognize the different
experiences of women and men within the police, as well
as to implement gender policies for the institution.
6. The Introduction of COP in the PNC
In his opening speech in 2009, Commissioner Carlos
Ascencio—the appointed police director at the beginning of
the FMLN presidential period—, called for a re-evaluation of
the police’s development. He argued that strengthening the
police as an institution required an institutional self-critique
of the initial conception of the police in close relation to the
community, and proposed the introduction of an integral ap-
proach to security that prioritized preventive measures and
community-oriented practices [56]. Community-Oriented
Policing (COP) is understood as a transversal policing phi-
losophy that prioritizes the community in the processes of
identification and solution of problems, as well as in the
evaluation of the police work [57]. Since then, COP has
been mainstreamed into the PNC first as a philosophy of
policing, and more recently as a strategy and a policing
model.
The first attempt to implement community policing was
through the Community Police Intervention Patrols (PIP-
COM, by its Spanish acronym), which were created dur-
ing the Francisco Flores administration (1999–2004) and
within the framework of the Alliance for Security. These
patrols received funding and technical guidance from the
US Department of Justice’s Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP).
Commissioner Hugo Ramirez, former sub-director of
Public Security (until 2019), was the first to implement a
PIP-COM in Zacamil, Mejicanos. According to him, the
model aimed at effective patrolling to offer responses to
crimes affecting communities such as drug dealing and
robberies. The PIP-COM sought to reduce crime through
planned preventative-dissuasive patrolling, quick response
times, community integration and consultation. This ap-
proach was novel in that the patrolling was done by foot,
bicycles, or by car in groups of four agents, with the intention
that the police agents had more chances to be involved with
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the community. The plan was to gradually implement this
program and expand it to the rest of the country. However,
due to insufficient funding as well as limited follow up and
monitoring, it was unable to establish itself firmly enough to
take root in the work methodology that had inspired it.
In a 2018 interview with Hilda, a middle-ranking police
woman, she explained that when she started working with
the police, the PIP-Com’s model was already established.
Hilda commented that these ended up becoming more akin
to intervention patrols than community policing: “they were
more PIP than Com”. This overemphasis on intervention pa-
trolling policing, the PIP part of it according to Hilda, can be
explained by the first period of justified militarization of the
police [4]. Despite being classified as ‘a failure,’ because
of a lack of institutional support and a clear communitarian
strategy that turned the PIP-COMs into repressive groups
[58], this format remains active in El Salvador, performing
duties very similar to those described at its origins. Nev-
ertheless, more serious steps toward a community-based
model began in 2006, when the Department of Community
Relations was made a Secretariat with greater authority to
design and execute policies. Under that Secretariat, the
Community Police Unit began the task of systemization with
support from the ANSP, which concentrated on drafting the
Experimental Manual on Community Policing.
The current COP model has been strongly supported
on a technical level by the Japanese Development Agency,
JICA, since 2011 until today. The terms of their support in-
clude the drafting of the Manual on Community Policing, the
construction of COP bases, and the exchange with mem-
bers of the Military Police of Sao Paulo, Brazil. The Police
Pacification Units (UPP, in Portuguese), became a source
of inspiration for the implementation of repressive tactics
vis-à-vis the establishment of COP, especially in areas with
high presence of gangs where the territory was disputed.
The UPP is a tropicalization—and one could say
a militarization—of the Japanese Koban model, where
communitarian-security bases are placed in local commu-
nities. In Rio and Sao Paulo, this model was implemented
by the Military Police to ‘clean’ favelas of drug traffickers
and gangs, enforcing law into these areas with military
strategies, to be able to introduce a new communitarian
police base in the intervened areas [59]. According to Com-
missioner Ramirez, the UPP’s failed because of lack of
sustainability of the model. First, because the police was
the only institution in areas abandoned by the state, result-
ing in the UPP’s model of first enforcing law, then setting
up preventive programs with a communitarian approach,
and leaving afterwards did not stabilize the areas or made
a security project sustainable. Second, as their preven-
tive programs with the community were not state-led but
sporadically sponsored by private companies, they lacked
economic sustainability. In this sense, according to Com-
missioner Ramirez, the Salvadorian model has exceeded
the UPP and learned from its failures.
The Salvadorian police domesticated the tropicalization
of the COP model done by the Brazilian Military Police, by
implementing it as a strategy to dismantle the gang control
over certain territories. Commissioner Ramirez expressed
that COP in El Salvador has been projected differently, be-
ing more integral and long-term. Nevertheless, other voices
from the police criticize the instrumental role assigned to
COP and claim that there is still little understanding of com-
munity policing. Early in 2019, Pedro, a mid-ranking police
officer in San Salvador, stated in an interview that COP in
El Salvador is more ambitious in comparison to its imple-
mentation in Brazil, because the PNC works with a COP
philosophy on a national level. There is, however, a need to
evaluate whether the methodology and the strategy have
been adequate. This is because,according to him, “a short-
sighted culture has taught us to not look beyond but to react
to situations, jamming us (in the PNC) to the delinquent
problem and not allowing us to even do effective investiga-
tions. And this is also because a whole social phenomenon
has been charged to the police”.
Nevertheless, COP was introduced after two periods of
militarization, meaning that the already fragile police force’s
civil practice has been under military influence for more
than a decade, privileging a violent masculine expectation
on the practice of policing. Moreover, the construction of
gangs as a security concern that needed to be contended
by means of heavy-handed measures, was already deeply
implanted in the mentality of the people. Within the police,
it worked to continue the war-notion of the ‘enemy,’ making
it difficult to transform with a communitarian approach.
7. COP: Rambo vs. Sissy Police
Pedro, the mid-ranking officer in San Salvador, also argues
that there is a cultural resistance to the COP model within
the police, and a misconception of the mission of the police
as an institution, and the role of the police as an agent.
According to him, the Salvadorian Constitution defines the
mission of the PNC is to prevent and repress crime. How-
ever, many in the police perceive that their mission is mainly
to enforce the law and repress crime. Pedro claims that the
average police agent perceives his role as being based on
a “Rambo” prototype created by Hollywood movies, where
the police agent is always either capturing or fighting crime,
but not working on prevention. Prevention and particularly
COP are associated with “soft” and “gentle” characteristics.
In other words, they are seen as ‘sissy policing’. This refer-
ence to supposed effeminate behavior genders the use of
violence within the police and the perception police agents
have of their role.
The Salvadorian police commonly state that people in
El Salvador are violent. This is often followed with the state-
ment “it is difficult for the police to respect all the human
rights of all the people’ because ‘one cannot be blandito
(soft)”. Supporting Pedro’s statement, being soft in their
eyes is a synonym of being weak. Dominant masculinities
are not weak, or at least the projection of masculinity is
not weak. From a masculinity studies perspective Kimmel
states, “manhood is about defense against humiliation” [60].
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For that reason, for the police agents the use of force is not
only necessary but encouraged among each other when
they start working in the streets. Furthermore, Connell ar-
gues that violence is an important element in the political
structure of gender between men [61]. Therefore, violence
or force can be used to reclaim masculinity within group
struggles. In a social decomposition process violence is
used as a form of dominance that is imperfect because it
is not legitimate. In the case of the police, the filtrated mili-
tary logics fractured the fragile new civilian approach, and
naturalized the need to prove the use of force and violence
as a masculine faculty in a context of social and economic
emasculation [62]. The same logic, however, thrives within
gangs as violence is used as an expression of power and
identity [15,20].
With this expectation of masculinity, COP is rendered
as soft policing. Therefore, many police officers are of the
opinion that community policing is an additional conceptual
approach to policing that can be omitted once graduated
from the ANSP, because it is not the ‘proper’ way of policing
the Salvadorian streets. As different police agents stated in
informal discussions and group interviews, ‘what you learn
in the academy is theoretical and there is no use for it in the
streets.’ Hence, from their perspectives the implementation
of COP is supplementary to existing repressive strategies.
According to Pedro, the filtration of the military in security
and the lack of implementation of COP relate to state insti-
tutional weakness, which the FMLN administration aimed to
overcome by strengthening the public security body. For Pe-
dro, this demonstrates that there is a limited understanding
of security and its practice by the police. For this police offi-
cer, the methods implemented in the attempts to strengthen
the State’s capacity have been counter-productive to the
COP model as they focus on repressive strategies that can
provide speedy results by weakening delinquent structures
and ‘re-gaining’ control of the territory.
An example of military strengthening of the public secu-
rity practice to overcome the state’s institutional weakness,
can be seen in the ‘swept and COP’ strategy, institution-
alized since April 2018 by the administration of Sanchez
Cerén as ‘Plan 10.’ This plan’s focus is on the reduction
of delinquency, and the control of the territory, with more
presence of PNC in urban areas, and the conjoint work of
PNC and Armed Forces in the rural areas [63]. In this plan,
Community-Oriented Policing has been instrumental to pro-
mote the perception of policing practices that are done in
consultation with the community while, nonetheless, the
practice is based on military action, inspired in the Brazil-
ian UPPs. Hence, in this plan COP strategies have been
introduced in High Delinquent Incidence Sectors (SAID, in
Spanish), as stabilizers of security after special security
forces have ‘swept’ the area from gang members.
The paradoxical relationship between institutional weak-
ness and a limited understanding of security, as previously
pointed by Pedro, can be explained if security is understood
as a public good that is provided by the state. Then, the
weakness of the state contributes to the gradual erosion of
this understanding of security [64]. Therefore, if the state
is weak, there are fewer expectations on what it can do to
transform the situation of violence; there is also less ac-
countability, and a pressure for short-term results, which
justify shock tactic approaches. For Pedro, this is a logic
of ‘cleaning the ground’ that translates to the deployment
of special security forces rather than community-oriented
policing into violent contexts. From his point of view, this
perspective limits the role of the police in the fulfillment of
their mission, as the police is merely understood as a crime
repressor instead of a service-oriented agent; reproducing
the Rambo-like mentality that gives more value to opera-
tive shock strategies than to community-oriented strategies.
There is a direct relation between the implementation of
security practices and the definition of security by the state.
The ‘Plan 10’ security plan falls into this logic that Pedro
critiques, as it is targeting mainly socio-economically disad-
vantaged communities with high levels of delinquency, with
the intention to ‘clean’ the area of delinquency and gang
structures. This strategy seems to be based on an unsus-
tainability Rambo mentality, and is problematic for several
reasons. The first and most obvious is the notion of ‘clean-
ing’ a community, in order to offer speedy security results,
which replicates a war-like logic of the ‘internal enemy’ [37],
based on the notion that communities can be cleaned from
unwanted individuals. This is problematic not only because
it constructs categories of ‘lives that matter,’ but because it
also ignores the socio-economic context and the conditions
that allowed for the consolidation of delinquency and gangs
in the territory. Second, the idea of introducing COP to sta-
bilize an area with the intention to evacuate after it is ‘stable’
is taking advantage of the communities. Since this security
intervention does not address the social problematics af-
fecting the communities, it is exploiting their needs to adapt
and survive, and the trust mechanisms developed between
community and police members. These social problematics
should be addressed by other state institutions different
from the police, for that reason it is questionable that the
state pretends to ‘stabilize’ the conditions of these com-
munities exclusively through the sporadic presence of the
police.
Furthermore, this plan clearly differentiates the two polic-
ing styles in the country but also merges them together to
make military approaches to public security appear sustain-
able. However, the sustainability of this plan depends on
the sustainability of COP in the territories. Nevertheless,
when the whole COP approach is not taken seriously by
the PNC itself, and depends on the willingness of the local
police members, this sustainability is hindered by the same
plan’s short-term design.
On a field visit to a rural community in the department
of Cabañas, in March 2018, it was apparent how fragile
COP can be when its role in a short-term security plan is
merely instrumental. According to community represen-
tatives, the community used to be peaceful until it saw a
spiral of violence in 2017 initiated by gang’s territorial dis-
pute, causing displacement of many families and young
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people to Mexico and the United States, as well as many
homicides of members of the community. The police came
with shock tactics in an open confrontation with gang mem-
bers, and many were killed, and others were sentenced to
prison. After this intervention, a new police group was sent
to the community. This time it was the rural police’s turn—
equipped with rifles and a community-oriented discourse—,
to stabilize the situation and built trust relationships with
the community. According to Giovanny, a police agent in
charge of the sector, building trust-relationships with the
community was very difficult at the beginning. They tried
to follow the script and go door-to-door around the commu-
nity, explaining their job and getting information from the
people. It did not work as planned; people were afraid of
them and distrusted them. Instead, these police agents saw
an opportunity to interact with members of the community
elsewhere. In this case, trust had to be built away from the
‘typical’ security discourse; in this case, the football field
became the place where the police showed the community
they could be trusted.
The rural police earned the trust of the children and
youth that used the field by guarding their games and sup-
porting their tournaments, eventually earning their parents
trust and having a snowball effect within the rest of the
community. This trust, according to the community rep-
resentatives, was possible because the police stayed in
the community and got to know the people that lived there,
especially the youth. Now that the plan is over and the
place is safer, the community fears the withdrawal of the
rural-police and the ‘sporadic’ patrol done by new police
who do not know the needs of the community. The com-
munity believes that once the rural police is removed, the
youth will be targeted again, and crime will return amidst
rampant social insecurity. In these contexts, a COP strategy
can only be sustainable if it takes part of a long-term plan
that includes the community, and not just of a short-term
approach to mask military action under the effectivity of
community-policing.
Nevertheless, securitization and militarization have been
planted deeply into the security logics of the country, de-
spite the change of administrations and political discourse.
Consequently, despite the spread of COP, Martínez [54] has
claimed that Sanchez Cerén “launched the most violent and
murderous repressive strategy that El Salvador has seen
this century”. Since 2016, the Sanchez Cerén administra-
tion launched the program Extraordinary Security Measures
to crack down on the gangs, focusing on restrictions in the
prison system, legal reforms to the criminal procedure code,
among others, and again, militarization. By normalizing the
military inherence in the internal security and their opera-
tive support to the police, this administration embraced a
strategy of open war against the gangs, further justifying
the use of lethal force [65].
Following this logic, communities with higher levels of
criminal violence and torn social fabric, but not prioritized
as the SAID, often do not have the presence of commu-
nity policing units and only interact with militarized units.
These units mistreat them to the extent that women from a
rural community in central El Salvador suggest that “there is
more fear towards them (the police) than the boys (gangs)”.
For those communities who have a presence of police that
actively approaches them, the police represent a threat
and jeopardize their security within their communities as
it flags them as collaborators with the police. Hilda, the
mid-ranking police woman, also reflected on this situation
in one of our interviews, discussing how problematic the
heavy-handed measures were for the community-police
relationship. “When the gangs began, instead of looking
for real causes and looking for alternatives that really ac-
counted for the phenomenon, more repressive and harder
measures were adopted. (...) You could not see anyone on
the street because we did take them all to jail. (...) Then,
when we wanted to get closer to the community and see
what we could do, many communities did not want the po-
lice to come. They were vulnerable”. In these cases, people
do not trust the police because in their everyday reality, en-
counters with the police are marked by fear and repression.
Therefore, understand the community policing philosophy
not as a concrete effort of the police, but as an instrumental
discourse to get close to the community during the day,
extract information, and repress them at night with special
units.
As Cynthia Enloe expresses it, “militarization occurs be-
cause some people’s fears are allowed to be heard, while
other people’s fear are trivialized and silenced” [66]. In
masculine driven societies, such as El Salvador, men feel
constant pressure to prove their manhood by means of
aggression; thus, the introduction of a military mindset in
the police has, for example, legitimated the use of violence
as a successful proof of masculinity. Following the use of
the military-police special forces, in comparison to 2015,
when El Salvador gained the infamous title of being the
most violent country not at war in the world, with a homicide
rate of 104 per 100,000 inhabitants, the homicide rate in
2016 was reduced to 81.2 per 100,000 inhabitants, to 60
in 2017, and 51 per 100,000 in 2018 [67]. Although these
numbers are still considered to be epidemic by the World
Health Organization, the administration of Sánchez Cerén
proudly highlighted the decrease in homicides, calling for
the successful implementation of the security strategies. In
parallel, a strategic silence was kept about the increase in
the abuse of force by the police and the numerous cases of
extra-judicial killings of alleged gang members by Special
Security commands within the PNC [68,69], the increase
in the killings of women [70], and members of the LGBT
community [71]. So far, there seems to be a correlation
between the reduction of homicides, the increase in extra-
judicial killings, the increase in gender-based violence, and
violent-militarized masculinities.
8. The Gendered Nature of Security in Practice
It is possible to assert that the State operates with a notion
of security that is masculinist. This gives higher visibility
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to ‘public’ security concerns, while it remains silent around
other forms of insecurity and violence caused by accepted
definitions of masculinity. In an attempt to bring public
awareness to other forms of violence affecting women, fem-
inist and women’s organizations point to the high levels
of feminicidios (femicide) [72] The number of feminicides
makes El Salvador one of the most dangerous countries
in the world for women. Women’s organizations hold the
state for being partially responsible for the impunity shown
towards the perpetrators of the 1,518 cases of feminicide
reported from January 2015 to June 2017 [73]. Feminicide,
or the killing of a women based on gender, became a crime
in the Salvadoran jurisprudence with the introduction of the
LEIV (Special Law for a Life Free from Violence for Women)
in January 2012. Despite the creation of the new law, most
of these killings have been categorised by the police as
homicides. The designation of a killing as a feminicide is
only made possible once the investigation has confirmed
that women had been killed because of their gender, and
rulings on this are dependent on the investigation of the
crime and the interpretation from the judge.
The problem of impunity is made further visible in the
high number of women killed in El Salvador i.e. 13,49 for
every 100,000 in 2017 according to data from the PNC [74].
Compared to 2017, with 471 feminicidios, 2018 saw a 20%
reduction in the killings of women and, according to the
PNC, there were 381 feminicides. According to the infor-
mation gathered by the women’s organization ORMUSA,
many of these cases happened in the private sphere or in
locations that are familiar to the victim [75].
According to women organizations, there are also cases
were women have been kidnapped by organized crime.
However, there is has been a very poor record kept by the
police with regards to the registration of reports of these
kind [76]. According to a representative from the women
organization Las Dignas, “women do not have major pro-
tection from anyone,” the police and the military, as well
as the gangs, threaten them. However, this experience is
not reflected in the public narrative, in which there is no
discussion about women being perceived as sexual ob-
jects or suffering from sexual harassment, sexual violations,
and feminicide. In further discussions with other members
of Las Dignas, amongst women, there are socially invisi-
ble groups, such as lesbians, which suffer discrimination
in society. This is reflected in their difficulties to access
health services, and experiences of lack of respect and ha-
rassment from security forces. The Trans-community also
reports high levels of impunity in connection with the hate
crimes perpetrated against them since 1990. These are
calculated by LGBT Human Rights Organizations to be as
high as 600 [77]. These organizations, such as COMCAVIS,
and ASPIDH-ARCOIRIS, state that gang members and the
police threaten transgender people; while the gangs use
them as carriers of illegal activities, the police criminalize
them based on this stereotype [78]. There is also structural
violence. Without state recognition as a gender specific
group trans people find it difficult to access social services.
Challenging the public security narrative takes us to
question the silence around gender in connection to the
differentiated impact lethal violence has on different bodies.
Therefore, men being killed by other men, in connection
to criminality or the ‘war against gangs’, has been normal-
ized in the public narrative, while women and other gen-
der minorities’ deaths, whom are mainly killed because of
their gender identity or their gender expression, remains ac-
cepted but invisible. These gender-based crimes, taking the
form of feminicides and transfeminicides, are supported by
the patriarchal construction of ownership of female bodies
and a need to reaffirm masculinity by attacking those that
do not comply with a hetero-normative model [79]. This has
a twofold effect. On the one hand, it hides the gendered
dimensions of violence, downplaying non-normative expres-
sions of violence—such as domestic forms of violence and
violence against women and girls, or hate crimes—from the
public sphere, thus locating them in the private sphere and
not challenging the silence around them. In addition, by only
focusing on violence against women as a gendered type
of violence it perpetuates the notion that men are not gen-
dered, masking the impacts of a masculinist approach to
violence, mainly in its militarized form and the securitization
of the public agenda.
9. Gender Awareness in the Police
Women and LGBTI organizations have lobbied for laws or
protocols that recognize their specific security concerns
and ways to protect them from violence. In 2010 the LEIV
was sanctioned. This law acknowledges seven different
forms of violence that affect women in the everyday life and
that remain invisible to the public eye. These are economic
violence, feminicide violence, physical violence, emotional
and psychological violence, patrimonial violence, sexual vio-
lence, and symbolic violence [80]. LGBTI organizations, on
their part, have lobbied for protocols against discrimination
and for inclusion. The Executive Decree No. 56 to reduce
discrimination against LGBTI population was sanctioned
in 2010, and the Attention Policy for the LGBTI Population
was sanctioned in 2018. Still, these bureaucratic measure-
ments have had little ripple effect on the everyday police
agent in terms of challenging masculine, misogynistic, and
hetero-normative ideas. Reports suggest that the police
are recognized as violators of the human rights of women
and LGBT people, particularly trans women [31,71].
Responding to a new political ideology and the pressure
from feminist and LGBTI Organizations, in 2009 there was
a presidential mandate to incorporate gender diversity and
vulnerable groups into the work of the police. The creation
of a Gender Unit and a Gender Equity and Equality Policy
were implemented as part of the Institutional Strategic Plan
of the police for 2011-2021. Furthermore, the article 25 of
the LEIV stipulates the creation of institutional units for as-
sisting women victims of violence. Following this mandate,
the PNC established Special Womens’ Units for Support
and Attention, which specialized in gender-based violence
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against women. The units were organized under the Office
for Reporting and Attention to Civilians (UNIMUJER-ODAC
in Spanish). The intention of these units is to provide a sep-
arate, comfortable and safe space for women to denounce
crime and abuse without being re-victimized. These units
also represented the possibility of offering a differential
approach to women’s insecurities, including transgender
women. However, this inclusion depends on the informed
discretion of the personnel from each unit, as the LEIV
does not directly include trans-women but other protocols
sanction discriminatory actions by state institutions.
The creation of special units for women have proved to
be an important opportunity to create a trust relationship
between the police and the women from the communities,
because (as women organizations warn) ‘community is not
a synonym of women’ [81], and spaces with a differential
approach are welcome in different communities. There are
examples, one comes from the community of Texistepeque,
where one female police agent has developed ‘a good COP
practice’, according to the PNC, by evaluating the condi-
tions of the community and offering alternatives to mitigate
social risks. In this case, agent Ana Maria saw that the lack
of income-generating activities in a shrinking agricultural
economy was a risk for both for males and females of the
community, that needed to be addressed. Therefore, in
dialogue with the community and with the support of the
PNC, she organized training courses to offer women and
men in the community professional skills they could use to
be economically independent. Through these courses and
her interest in the social conditions of the community, the
agent began to be more involved in the everyday concerns
of the community, and the community began to organize
themselves more. In the everyday involvement trust rela-
tionships were consolidated, allowing the police to map
other insecurities that were elusive before, such as eco-
nomic and social insecurities related to the lack of jobs in
the area. As well as cases of sexual or domestic violence,
drug dealing, and gang related threats to members of the
community. This example addresses differential security
concerns of the community that go beyond the traditional
police approach but gets closer to a broader definition of
security that prioritizes the community.
The police, however, still have difficulty understanding
the complex position of women in the communities. Women,
including trans-women, are vulnerable to violence in areas
controlled by gangs for different reasons. Some of those
are related to being family members, friends, or neighbors
of gang members [31]. In discussions with young women
living in gang-controlled areas, they expressed a constant
fear of being kidnapped, raped or killed by the gang mem-
bers. As the coordinator of ORMUSA’s Violence against
Women’s program highlights, “women live in a mortal dual-
ity”, as whatever they do, in terms of denouncing, inform-
ing, or resisting/ tolerating violence, is perceived as double
betrayal to the gang and to the police. Therefore, many
of these women are in a difficult position that reflects the
power tensions in the community between the police and
the gangs. In these cases, the social control operated by
the gang impact the legal power attributed to the police and
its faculty for public security. Therefore, in some cases the
UNIMUJER-ODAC’s capacity to register cases and map the
specific insecurities of women in some communities has
weakened because of the security risks affecting women
and their families if they contact the police. Besides these
risks, fieldwork shows there is a general mistrust in the
judicial system, characterized by impunity, especially when
a victim is a woman or member of the LGBT community
and comes from a low socio-economic class [79,82,83].
If gender relations between women and diversity groups
with the police are detrimental for the former, it is striking to
see the insecurities’ female police officers face within the
institution itself, and how these reflect power relations in
society. Given that the police are immersed in the coun-
try’s cultural gender constructions, policewomen encounter
many difficulties in attempting to fulfill their work. According
to Hilda, a middle-ranking police woman, there is a problem
with gender within the police because many men in power
still think there is no need to make changes that can differ-
entially include women, or to make women visible. Men still
think that the space for women is at home.
“The problem with gender is that men believe that when
it comes to women there is no need to make changes. Be-
cause they still believe that, the things that are said for them
are also said for us. And when we want to make use of
those laws that are written in male, simply when they make
legal interpretations, they say no, that (those laws) refer
to men. So? And they do not want to make us visible in
the laws either. It is very complicated, even despite all the
individual will that exist, of some men who are in important
positions, the assumption that it is not necessary for women
to be visible prevails. And I think many are still thinking that
our space is cooking and taking care of children” [84].
Hilda’s statement reflects the difficulties for women to
access law in general. In the police, she says, there is a
similar situation. By the time of the interview in 2017, there
were 2,875 female officers in total in the institution in com-
parison to 20,095 policemen. Of those, only 21 women are
in high-ranking roles compared to 138 men, and 79 women
are in mid-ranking roles in comparison to 735 men. These
numbers are telling of the remaining gender gaps within the
institution.
It is very common for policewomen to experience verbal
abuse from policemen, regardless of their rank. There are
around 1–2 accusations daily. Furthermore, according to
female police participants in the group interview, there are
many reasons for this, some of which are related to gen-
der stereotypes that position women as weak and in need
of protection, which hampers women’s police in operative
work. Another common problem women police encounter
is sexual harassment by other police members, which re-
flects power imbalances at work, a macho culture, and poor
infrastructure for women to feel safe.
Therefore, by becoming aware of the mechanisms within
the police to ensure gender equity and equality, a diverse
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group of female officers is acknowledging the remaining
unequal power structures and the different forms of vio-
lence they experience in their work. Led by the Gender
Unit of the PNC and supported by feminist organizations,
they have organized themselves in a network as supporters
and protectors of their rights i.e. the Women Defenders
Network of Human Rights of Women working in the Na-
tional Civil Police. The intention of this network is to support
women in the police to denounce cases of abuse, violence,
or discrimination in their work environment. The network
also works to support the leadership position of female
police within the institution. Furthermore, this network of
female police, as well as the women special units, can be
understood as an attempt to close the gap between policy
and practice in the implementation of gender and COP. In
their current situation, they remain imperfect examples of
gender-sensitive approaches to human security policies,
because even though they include a differentiated security
need, from the perspective of women, they are still rele-
gated from an institutional discussion about the meaning of
security and the role of gender. The Gender Unit in the PNC
with the support of women organizations has attempted to
open these discussions within the police, but they remain
marginalized in a rigid hierarchical structure.
Loyalty to the institution is stronger than strategic gen-
der alliances. Thinking back on the gender imbalance in
police members, it is striking to see how male dominated
the police in El Salvador remains regardless of attempts to
make it more inclusive. This characteristic is similar to the
almost exclusively male constitution of the military. Even
though women have taken military roles since 1980, they
“have not challenged the state military’s essentially mas-
culinized culture” [44]. The PNC remains a brotherhood,
not a sisterhood. This was shockingly demonstrated by
the feminicide of the police agent Carla Ayala, shot and
disappeared by another police agent in an official car on
December 28th, 2017. After the news went public, it took
the PNC nine months to find her remains and more than a
year to determine it was a case of feminicide. The agent
who killed her is still a fugitive [85,86].
Cases of feminicide within the police are not new but re-
main invisible because of the macho culture that dominates.
Rendering these cases visible and creating gender self-
awareness is a difficult task when women in the institution
feel they must prove themselves as worthy of the job and
loyal enough to be accepted into ‘the pack’. Therefore, the
case of Carla Ayala shook the police at the deepest level
and challenged the naturalization of gender-based violence
against women within the institution. This demonstrated
that beyond gender mainstreaming, there is a need to trans-
form the cultural constructions and understandings about
gender and the use of violence, as this not only affects the
development of the police as an inclusive institution but also
its approach to their policing work. For the successful imple-
mentation of COP and gender, there is a need to revise the
PNC’s own system of accountability within the institution
and towards the community [87].
10. Conclusions
The 1992 Peace Accords and Security Reform were an op-
portunity to de-militarize, professionalize and create a new
security paradigm in El Salvador based on a civilian focus
and mandate that could safeguard a sustainable peace.
However, research focused on current realities reveals
that the objectives of this reform are closer to unfulfilled
promises than to actual transformations within the police
and the overall security structure.
This article reveals that the security reform focused on
the structural transformation of the military and the police
failed to sufficiently question the meaning of security or the
identity of the subject of security and the security provider.
By neglecting to question the object and matter of security
in a country that had been under military rule almost since
its foundation [4], the relationship between male dominance,
the state, and security was ignored. Masculine security log-
ics were portrayed as being gender neutral. However better
reframed as gender blind, the security logic in El Salvador
has rendered invisible the differential experiences of inse-
curity and violence in the country by restricting security
to criminality, while naturalizing forms of gender-based vi-
olence against women and sexually diverse groups and
ignoring the socio-economic origins of post-war insecurity.
The gendered construction of security and the limits of its
definition have restrictively gendered the work of the po-
lice, privileging repressive tactics to address crime and
insecurity instead of new approaches to policing that could
reduce violence and bring social transformation, such as
Community-Oriented Policing.
I have argued above that the gendered nature of se-
curity policy allowed post-war administrations to justify the
introduction of military personnel and logics into internal
security policy and policing in the country. Furthermore,
the presence of ex-combatants in the new police, made
possible through the quota system, contaminated the early
development of this institution and revealed it to be a new
political battlefield. All the administrations that followed the
1992 Peace Agreements have until present constructed
and strengthened a narrative of security based on a war-
like scenario that reminds of the 12 years of confrontations
between the guerrillas and the state.
I have also highlighted above that prevalence of a mas-
culinist state and the privileging of male dominance and the
cultural associations of violence and masculinity, has not
permitted the implementation of integral approaches to se-
curity and models of policing that prioritize community work
over operative strategies with the objective of reducing vio-
lence. In this context, fieldwork reveals that the local police
agents found themselves between the need to fulfill their
duties as preventers and repressors of crime, implementing
COP while taking part or acknowledging joint military-police
operations in similar communities, if not the same, in the
name of security. These military-police operations have
validated the performance of violent masculinities within
the PNC to the level that police students newly graduated
81
from the ANSP already know that they will have to assume
a tough approach to policing in the streets if they want to
be accepted. Women police officers also feel a constant
need to prove they can perform a tough, almost violent
masculinity in order to be accepted into operative work.
This paper argues that, by failing to question the subject
of security and its gendered dimension, it has been impos-
sible to secure good results from the introduction of COP
in El Salvador. I suggest that this is because the police do
not operate in a cultural or social vacuum but is embedded
in society. Socio-cultural assumptions that value and justify
dominant and authoritative expressions of masculinity over
the autonomy of the female body and the recognition of
other forms of violence, influence the state responses to
insecurity and, therefore, the focus of the police towards
repression instead of prevention. Privileging militarized
security strategies renders other forms of policing as less
efficient, effective, and, thus, less masculine. In this context,
COP has become little more than a marginal approach to
policing and gender no more than a mainstreamed formality.
Nevertheless, when the subject of security is stretched
and the different security needs of women, men and LGBTI
population in the community are included, it creates alter-
natives able to transform community-police relationships by
means of challenging militarized expectations and ‘violent’
traditions within the police. The discussion presented in this
article illustrates the idea that when the subject of security
is challenged and gender is not ignored, policing can take
other forms and focus more on the people it aims to serve,
making room for the implementation of democratic policing
to take place in the form of community-oriented practice.
Therefore, more efforts and research need to be put into
understanding and supporting the transforming gendered
expectations of security within the police, as a bottom-up
approach to gender mainstreaming the security policy in El
Salvador.
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